To explain this cross-national paradox, the paradox of power explains political redistributions of income from the family income but redistribution through the tax-transfer system raised their share to Nov 27, 2014 2.2.1 Measures of inequality, redistribution and progressivity Korpi W, Palme J: The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: May 2, 2018 no evidence of a “Robin Hood paradox”; the more unequal countries tend to spend more on redistribution and show a higher redistributive more whereas the “Robin Hood paradox” is an often used characteristic and starting point of theories aiming at explaining the opposite (i.e., that they redistribute Feb 20, 2019 (Lindert, 2004, page 15): “History reveals a “Robin Hood paradox,” in which redistribution from rich to poor is least present when and where it Jul 17, 2017 Why do people support economic redistribution? (1998) The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare state institutions, Apr 6, 2019 "Paradox of Redistribution: Politics of Collective Bargaining at the Bottom The Politics of Inequality and Redistribution 4/7 9:45AM #MPSA19 961. VOL. 95 NO. 4. ALESINA AND ANGELETOS: FAIRNESS AND REDISTRIBUTION Corruption and the 'Paradox of Redistribution'. Social Indicators. The transfer paradox occurs when donors gain in utility while recipients lose.

By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a "paradox of redistribution" can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently large. Simulation results show that the paradox is quite frequent (up to 30 percent) and increases with n (at least for small n). The new ‘paradox of redistribution’?-A comparative study on migrant poverty in 15 European welfare states Author: Lutz Gschwind Supervisor: Joakim Palme 2017-07-28 · The paradox of redistribution * refers to the fact that welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to universal programs tend to be more redistributive than welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to targeted programs. Inequality has received renewed attention in the public as well as in the academic debate. According to one theory, the development of redistribution and inequality reflects the institutional desig Donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction. We investigate the causes of variation over time and donors by employing both a regression approach with aggregate data on bilateral aid and two short In voting bodies, when voting weights are reallocated, it may be observed that the voting power of some members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, increases while their voting weight decreases.

Political Science, Vol. 32 (August), pp. 371-374.

Carlos Bethencourt & Lars Kunze, 2015. "The political economics of redistribution, inequality and tax avoidance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 267-287, June. countries.

Ive Marx (*/**), Lina Salanauskaite (*) and Gerlinde Verbist (*) Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy, University of Antwerp Draft 17 May 2013 *University of Antwerp - Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy; Sint-Jacobstraat 2, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium; ** IZA, Bonn Thus, the ‘paradox of redistribution’ process can be illustrated as: Targeted spending (a) → identity priming (b 1) → polarization in attitudes (b 2) → redistribution (c). The whole ‘paradox of redistribution’ process occurs when each of these underlying events [from (a) through (c)] is activated. The relationship between the extent of targeting and redistributive impact over a broad set of empirical specifications, country selections and data sources has in fact become a very weak one. For what it matters, targeting tends to be associated with higher levels of redistribution, especially when overall effort in terms of spending is high. The reason for this paradox of redistribution, as shown in the table above, is that while taxes usually are relative (a fixed percentage of income for example), benefits or services are usually nominal. The extent of redistribution depends, in other words, not just on accuracy of aim but also on the sums transferred (Korpi and Palme 1998). Korpi and Palme’s (1998) classic “The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality” claims that universal social policy better reduces poverty than social policies targeted at the poor.

The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries 2015-03-11 · Therefore, instead of the “paradox of redistribution” we propose two new paradoxes of social policy: non-complementarity and undermining. The non-complementarity paradox entails a mismatch between the dimensions that matter to poverty and the dimension that matters to redistribution preferences. The paradox and its critics Korpi and Palme’s article on the paradox of redistribution remains one of the most widely cited articles in comparative welfare state research. They present and support a politically important and rather counterintuitive argument: the more social benefits are targeted to the poor, Taeko Hiroi, 2019. "Paradox of Redistribution: Legislative Overrepresentation and Regional Development in Brazil," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 642-670. The existing literature on the determinants of income redistribution has identified a ‘paradox’.
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8 See the introduction of the “Robin Hood paradox” in Lindert (2004, Ch. 1).

The existing literature on the determinants of income redistribution has identified a ‘paradox’. Namely, that countries with a high degree of market income inequality redistribute little, which is in disagreement with the median voter theorem. Effective redistribution, they argued, resulted less from a Robin Hood logic – taking from the rich to give to the poor – than from a broad and egalitarian provision of services and transfers.
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The current paper provides a state-of-the-art review of empirical research into that paradox. 2017-07-28 · The paradox of redistribution * refers to the fact that welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to universal programs tend to be more redistributive than welfare states in which a greater proportion of spending goes to targeted programs. By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a "paradox of redistribution" can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently large. Simulation results show that the paradox is quite frequent (up to 30 percent) and increases with n (at least for small n).

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Stewart N. Ethier (University of Utah) Jiyeon Lee (Yeungnam University) Sep 14, 2008 equality should raise redistribution in democracies, much empirical research has focused on the paradox of redistribution: explaining why the 22 май 2004 The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries. Apr 29, 2013 There's a bit of a social science old wives' tale out there holding that increased income doesn't really make people (or countries) happier THE PARADOX OF REDISTRIBUTION STRATEGIES OF EQUALITY 663 In an early critique of the emphasis on tar-geting in the U.S. policy debate, Korpi (1980a, 1983) contrasted a marginal social policy model with minimum benefits targeted at the poor with an institutional model based on universal programs intended to maintain Using new data, our comparative analyses of the effects of different institutional types of welfare states on poverty and inequality indicate that institutional differences lead to unexpected The debates on how to reduce poverty and inequality have focused on two controversial questions. One is whether social policies should be targeted to low- income groups or universal; another whether benefits should be equal for all or earnings-related. Traditional arguments in favor of targeting and flat-rate benefits, focusing on the distribution of the money actually transferred, have The constitutions of contemporary democracies uphold equal voting rights for citizens. Yet, this principle has in practice been breached in many countries due to disproportional allocation of legislative seats to electoral districts relative to their population size, known as malapportionment. paradox of redistribution’ theory is translated into a system dynamics model, and simulations are analyzed. The paper ends with a discussion and conclusion.